Pace Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 4 Summer 2008
Symposium: Victims and the Criminal Justice
System

Article 7

June 2008

Should Being a Victim of a Crime be a Defense to the Same or a
Different Crime?
Russell L. Christopher

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Russell L. Christopher, Should Being a Victim of a Crime be a Defense to the Same or a Different
Crime?, 28 Pace L. Rev. 783 (2008)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/7
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Should Being a Victim of a Crime Be a
Defense to the Same or a Different Crime?
Russell L. Christopher*
Should being a victim of a crime be a defense to the same or
different crime? The claim of being a victim is widely and easily
made as a bid for exculpation.' But, the criterion for a victimhood defense that I would like to propose is fairly narrow.
Where one and the same conduct renders an actor simultaneously a victim of a crime and a perpetrator of the same or a
different crime, the actor should have a defense to criminal liability. The rationale for such a defense, simply stated, is that
the criminal law cannot coherently define the very same conduct as that of an oppressed victim worthy of the law's protection and simultaneously that of an oppressing victimizer worthy
of the law's punishment.
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. Let us consider what is not meant here as victimhood being a defense.
When apprehended or prosecuted for a crime, one often hears a defendant claim
that he or she has been the "victim" of aggressive police tactics or a prosecutorial
rush to judgment. But here the invocation of victimhood is only informal. In addition, a defendant might more formally claim to be the victim of entrapment. But
the claim is still not to that of being the victim of a crime-entrapment is not a
crime.
The victimhood defense is also not that of having previously been a victim of
crime. If charged with child abuse, a defendant is often heard to claim by way of a
defense that he or she was abused as a child, and that in some way this causes or
correlates to revisiting this abuse on other children. Even if true, this regrettable
cycle of violence does not qualify as the type of defense proposed here. Perhaps it
is a story that arouses the sympathy of the jury or is a factor that is taken into
account in sentencing. But being a previous victim of a crime does not and should
not provide a basis for a defense to committing a crime.
One must currently be a victim of a crime while one commits conduct that is
charged to be a crime in order to be eligible for the proposed defense. But that is
still not sufficient. One might be the victim of having one's home burglarized while
one is away burgling another's home. Surely, that one is currently a victim of
crime while one is separately and independently committing conduct charged to be
a crime should not be a defense.
Rather, the issue is whether the very same conduct by which one perpetrates
or is charged with perpetrating a crime also renders one simultaneously a victim of
a crime.
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This brief essay takes the first tentative steps toward
sketching a defense for victimhood. First, the essay illustrates
the need for the defense by considering two examples concerning the intersection of rape by fraud and statutory rape. Second, the essay attempts to explain the rationale for the defense.
Third, the essay explores the extent to which the criminal law
recognizes the defense in some fashion. Fourth, the essay considers specific situations of victimhood claimed by commentators to warrant a defense. And finally, the essay considers a
possible counter-example to the proposed defense. The essay
concludes that while the defense may be strongly warranted in
some situations, it may resist uniform application.
Consider the following examples of an actor's conduct
which simultaneously renders the actor a victim of a crime and
a perpetrator of a crime. These examples will serve to explain
how this issue has arisen, as well as what is motivating this
exploration of the issue.
Suppose a minor, who is below the age of consent, but reasonably appears to be above the age of consent, affirmatively
represents being above the age of consent in order to obtain intercourse with an adult. The traditional and still majority rule
in America is that statutory rape is a strict liability crime with
respect to the element of the minor's age. 2 Thus, an adult's honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to the minor's age will not
be a defense. 3 Moreover, the adult is criminally liable for statutory rape despite that the minor's misrepresentation induced
the adult to engage in intercourse with the minor. 4 As a result,
under the traditional and still majority view, the adult is the
perpetrator of and the minor the victim of statutory rape.
In contrast to this traditional and majority view, I (along
with my co-author) have recently argued that a minor obtaining
intercourse with an adult by means of uttering an affirmative
and false representation of being above the age of consent com2. E.g., Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 49 (Md. 1999) (noting that the strict
liability approach to statutory rape is the majority rule).
3. See, e.g., State v. Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Wis. 2004) (The majority
rule is to bar a mistake of age defense to statutory rape "no matter how reasonable
the defendant's belief that the victim was old enough to consent, and no matter
that the belief is based on the victim's own representations.").
4. Id.
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mits rape by fraud. 5 Though not yet recognized by any court,
the minor's obtaining intercourse through a material misrepresentation qualifies as rape by fraud under the existing principles and standards in over thirty jurisdictions. 6 Moreover,
because the adult is defrauded into committing the very serious
crime of statutory rape, which is punishable by up to and exceeding twenty years' imprisonment, 7 the minor's "adult impersonation" more strongly qualifies as rape by fraud than most
widely recognized types of rape by fraud. 8 While the traditional
and majority rule views the adult as the perpetrator of and the
minor the victim of statutory rape, we argue that the minor is
the perpetrator and the adult the victim of rape by fraud. The
resulting situation is that the adult is simultaneously a perpetrator of statutory rape against the minor and a victim of rape
by fraud as perpetrated by the minor. The minor is simultaneously a perpetrator of rape by fraud against the adult and a victim of statutory rape as perpetrated by the adult.
As the victim of rape by fraud as perpetrated by the minor,
the adult should have a defense to statutory rape. We argued
as follows:
One who is fraudulently induced into engaging in intercourse
(and that fraud qualifies as rape by fraud), should not be criminally liable for that very act of intercourse. In reliance on the
statutory rape victim's false representation, the statutory rape
defendant agrees to engage in the intercourse. Only after, and
because of, the juvenile's fraudulent and criminal conduct does
the adult rape-by-fraud victim engage in the intercourse constituting statutory rape. Criminal liability should not attach to one
who becomes a perpetrator of statutory rape because s/he became
a victim of rape by fraud. In broader terms, one should not be
criminally liable as a perpetrator of statutory rape for the very act
of intercourse by which one is a victim of rape. 9
In still broader terms, being a victim of a crime supplies a
defense to a crime. That is, a defense should be available to a
5. See Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, Adult Impersonation: Rape by Fraud as a Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 75 (2007).
6. Id. at 91-105, 122.
7. See id. at 77 nn.10-11.
8. Id. at 99-102, 104-05.
9. Id. at 116-17 (citation omitted).
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crime that one perpetrates by the very same conduct by which
one simultaneously became a victim of a crime.
But, adult impersonation qualifying as rape by fraud is a
radical claim that is unrecognized by any court. As such, our
conclusion that because adults deserve a rape by fraud defense
in the case of misrepresentation of age there should be a general
defense for victims of crime is perhaps less reliable. Let us then
consider a comparatively more conventional case.
Suppose a minor, below the age of consent, obtains intercourse with an adult by impersonating her husband. By engaging in intercourse with the minor, the adult wife would be
committing statutory rape against the minor under the laws of
all fifty states. 10 The adult is the perpetrator and the minor is
the victim of statutory rape. Under the majority rule of strict
liability, the adult wife has no defense that she honestly and
reasonably believed that the minor was above the age of consent
(because she honestly and reasonably believed that the minor
was her husband).
But in at least sixteen states," and perhaps as many as a
majority of states, obtaining intercourse by spousal impersonation is a form of rape by fraud. 12 As a result, in these jurisdictions, the minor commits rape by fraud against the adult. The
adult is simultaneously a perpetrator of statutory rape against
the minor and a victim of rape by fraud as perpetrated by the
minor. The minor is simultaneously a perpetrator of rape by
fraud against the adult and a victim of statutory rape as perpetrated by the adult.
In a jurisdiction both following the strict liability rule of
statutory rape and recognizing spousal impersonation as rape
by fraud, should the adult have a defense to the crime of statutory rape? Yes. As discussed above, "one should not be criminally liable as a perpetrator of statutory rape for the very act of
10. See, e.g., State v. Blake, 777 A.2d 709, 713 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) ("All a
person need do to violate [Connecticut's statutory rape law] is to (1) engage in
sexual intercourse (2) with a person between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, and
(3) be at least two years older than such person.").
11. See Christopher & Christopher, supra note 5, at 100 nn.164-65.
12. E.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 585 (4th ed.
2006); PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS
OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 199 (2004).
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intercourse by which one is a victim of rape." 13 Or, put more
broadly, one should have a defense to a crime that one commits
through the same conduct that simultaneously makes one the
victim of crime. The adult perpetrates statutory rape by the
very same conduct through which she becomes a victim of rape
by fraud: engaging in intercourse with a spousal impersonator
who is below the age of consent.
In other jurisdictions, however, this proposed defense
would not apply. In a jurisdiction that both follows the strict
liability rule of statutory rape and does not recognize spousal
impersonation as rape by fraud, the adult would not have the
defense. In both types of jurisdictions, the actions of the minor
and the adult are the same. But, in the latter type of jurisdiction, the minor's conduct would not be classified as rape by
fraud. Thus, the adult would not be recognized as a victim of
rape by fraud and could not claim that defense to a charge of
statutory rape.
Why the difference as to the availability of the defense?
Why is the actor in a jurisdiction that recognizes spousal impersonation eligible for the defense and the actor in a jurisdiction
not recognizing spousal impersonation as rape by fraud not eligible for the defense? After all, the adult is identically induced
into engaging in intercourse with a minor by the same false and
material representation in both types of jurisdiction. Should
not the availability of a defense turn on the actual facts, circumstances, and conduct of the parties? Why should it turn on the
criminality of the fraud? If the juvenile's fraud rises to the level
of criminal fraud, the adult is a victim of rape by fraud. If the
juvenile's fraud is non-criminal, the adult is not a victim of rape
by fraud or any crime. Ultimately, it matters because of
victimhood.
Although I believe that it is deeply felt, the intuition that
being a victim of a crime should be a defense to a crime is not
easy to articulate. There is something counterintuitive about
holding an actor criminally liable for the very conduct that
makes the actor a victim of crime. Perhaps the best articulation
of this intuition is that the criminal law cannot coherently define particular conduct as both worthy of protection and worthy
13. See Christopher & Christopher, supra note 5, at 82.
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of punishment. Conduct rendering one a victim of a perpetrator's criminal conduct suggests the victim's conduct should be
worthy of protection. If so, how could conduct that is worthy of
protection also be worthy of punishment?
If the conduct of the adult wife renders her a victim of rape
by fraud via spousal impersonation, then that very same conduct cannot logically be punished as the perpetration of statutory rape. By treating the conduct of the perpetrator of the rape
by fraud as worthy of condemnation and punishment, the criminal law is treating the victim's conduct as worthy of protection.
Where the very conduct that renders one a victim of crime also
renders one a perpetrator of a crime, being a victim of a crime
should be a defense. Similarly, if the conduct of an adult renders him or her a victim of adult impersonation (assuming that
adult impersonation is recognized as a form of rape by fraud),
then that very same conduct cannot coherently be punished as
the perpetration of statutory rape. The criminal law cannot
classify the very same conduct to be that of an oppressed victim
worthy of the law's protection and simultaneously to be that of
an oppressing victimizer worthy of the law's punishment.
To what extent does the criminal law already recognize a
defense for being the victim of a crime? A scenario from the film
Beverly Hills Cop 14 illustrates one such defense. Axel Foley, as
played by the actor Eddie Murphy, is a police officer from Detroit questioning a prominent Beverly Hills businessman in his
posh office in regard to a murder investigation. Apparently not
liking the tenor of the questions, the suspect directs his henchmen to escort Axel from the premises. The henchmen throw
Axel through the plate glass window of the building's lobby and
onto the sidewalk. As Axel sits up amid the glass debris, the
Beverly Hills police arrive. Axel says, "Did you see this... ? I
can describe all of them." Instead of taking down the descriptions of Axel's victimizers, the Beverly Hills police begin to arrest him. Incredulous, Axel exclaims, "You guys are arresting
me for getting thrown out of a... window? I got thrown out of a
window, man! Tell me something, what's the charge?" The police inform Axel that he is being arrested for disturbing the
peace. Again incredulous, Axel replies, "Disturbing the peace?
14. BEVERLY HILLS Cop (Paramount Pictures 1984).
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I got thrown out of a window. What's the ...charge for getting
pushed out of a moving car-jaywalking?" It is the one and the
same conduct-being thrown through the glass window-that
renders Axel both a victim of a crime (i.e., battery) and a perpetrator of a crime (disorderly conduct).
Should the fact that Axel is a victim of a crime be a defense
to disorderly conduct? Perhaps, but we need not reach that issue because the criminal law already provides a defense to Axel
in that situation. Axel could presumably assert a successful defense of lack of a voluntary act. 15 Axel being thrown through a
window was either not an act at all on Axel's part or was an
involuntary act. Either way, his lack of a voluntary act would
bar his criminal liability.
Principles of accomplice liability and conspiracy also might
serve to supply a defense to a victim of crime who is charged
with a crime. As Joshua Dressler explains: "A person may not
be prosecuted as an accomplice in the commission of a crime if
he is a member of the class of persons for whom the statute
prohibiting the conduct was enacted to protect."'1 6 Consider the
example of a juvenile below the age of consent who willingly
acquiesces to intercourse with an adult and is thus a victim of
statutory rape. Despite aiding the offense in a sense, by willingly acquiescing and voluntarily participating, the juvenile victim could not be charged as an accomplice in her own statutory
17
rape.
Similarly, the victim of a Mann Act violation-the person
transported, knowingly by the transporter, across state lines for
prostitution or any other immoral purpose 1 8-cannot be convicted of engaging in a conspiracy to violate her own Mann Act
15. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1)-(2) (1985).
16. DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 526. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6)
(1985) ("[A] person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person
if: (a) he is a victim of that offense ....").

17. In re Meagan R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 328 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a
statutory rape victim cannot be criminally liable as an accomplice "to the crime of
her own statutory rape"); DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 526 ("For example, the statutory rape law was enacted to protect young females from immature decisions to
have sexual intercourse; the legislature considers her to be the victim of the offense. It would conflict with legislative intent, therefore, if she could be prosecuted
as a secondary party to her own statutory rape.").
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2005).
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rights. 19 That is, the victim of a Mann Act violation cannot be
charged as a conspirator in his or her own Mann Act violation.
In some states, being a victim of statutory rape precludes
prosecution for statutory rape. These states preclude liability
21
for so-called "peer on peer" 20 or "Romeo and Juliet" situations
in a variety of ways. A New York court barred prosecution of a
defendant who was below the age of consent "in the interest of
justice." 22 Other states require the defendant to be of a minimum age, 23 say eighteen, which is above the age of consent, or
require the defendant to be a number of years older than the
victim, 24 which effectively requires the defendant to be above
25
the age of consent.
In other situations, commentators have argued that the
criminal law should recognize a defense for a victim of a crime.
Consider the situation of a prostitute who is below the age of
consent and who engages in intercourse with an adult customer. The very conduct that renders the minor the victim of
statutory rape-engaging in intercourse with the adult customer-also renders the minor criminally liable for prostitution. Some commentators argue that the minor's status as a
statutory rape victim in any prostitution transaction should bar
the minor from criminal liability for perpetrating prostitution:
19. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 122-23 (1932); DRESSLER, supra
note 12, at 494.
20. Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionalityof Strict Liability in Sex Offender RegistrationLaws, 86 B.U. L. REv. 295, 314 (2006).
21. Id. at 314 n.84.
22. In re Jessie C., 565 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944 (App. Div. 1991).
23. Carpenter, supra note 20, at 314 & n.85 (citing, for example, Nebraska
and New York).
24. Id. at 314 & n.86 (citing, for example, Michigan).
25. But in some situations a victim of a crime that is charged with a crime
might not have a generalized, accepted defense to assert that bars liability. For
example, with respect to statutory rape, some states do prosecute victims of statutory rape for statutory rape of another. That is, despite being a juvenile below the
age of consent, such persons are nonetheless held criminally liable for statutory
rape. Carpenter, supra note 19, at 314 & nn. 85-87 (citing, for example, Alabama,
South Dakota, Georgia, and Rhode Island). In this context of two underage persons engaging in intercourse with each other, the very conduct that makes one a
victim of statutory rape (engaging in intercourse) is the very conduct that makes
one a perpetrator of statutory rape and criminally liable. But how can one and the
same conduct make one both a victim and a perpetrator? How can one and the
same conduct make one an oppressed victim worthy of the law's protection and
simultaneously an oppressing victimizer worthy of the law's punishment?
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A contradiction arises where juveniles are arrested, prosecuted,
and incarcerated for having sex for money or other consideration
under the same penal code that declares they have no legal capacity to consent to sex at all. If minors are incapable of sexual conjustify punishing them for
sent, how does the legal community 26
their commercial sexual exploitation?
Keith Aoki similarly declares holding minors criminally liable
for prostitution as illustrative of "shameful contradictions in
27
our laws."
A dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court of Nevada
makes the opposite argument. 28 A minor's status as a prostitute precludes her from being a statutory rape victim. 29 That is,
while perpetrating prostitution with an adult customer, an underage prostitute cannot be statutorily raped by that adult
30
customer.
In one sense, the commentators and the dissenting opinion
make opposite arguments: the former argue that statutory rape
victimhood bars prostitution liability, and the latter argues that
prostitution liability bars statutory rape victimhood. But in another sense, both argue that a minor engaging in intercourse
with an adult paying customer cannot simultaneously be perpetrating prostitution and be the victim of statutory rape. That is,
both agree that the minor cannot be both perpetrating a crime
and be the victim of a crime by performing the same conduct.
Wendi Adelson addresses the interaction of perpetration
and victimhood with respect to the crimes of human trafficking
and child prostitution. 31 Adelson poses the question: "Is child
26. See Pantea Javidan, Invisible Targets: Juvenile Prostitution,Crackdown
Legislation, and the Example of California, 9 C.ADOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 237, 238
(2003) (arguing that the application of prostitution laws against minors "cannot be
reconciled with statutory rape laws that define the age of consent.").
27. Keith Aoki, Does Nothing Ever Change; Is Everything New?: Comments on
the "To Do Feminist Legal Theory" Symposium, 9 CARDozo WOMEN'S L.J. 415, 419
(2003).
28. Jenkins v. State, 877 P.2d 1063 (Nev. 1993) (Singer, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1067 (affirming defendant's conviction for statutory rape by rejecting defendant's honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to the age of the victim defense).
30. Id. at 1067-68.
31. Wendi J. Adelson, Abstract, Child Prostituteor Victim of Trafficking?, SoCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1078503 (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
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prostitution a crime committed by minors or against them?"3 2
Adelson explains that "[if]ederal laws on trafficking consider
child prostitution to be akin to the crime of human trafficking
....,,33 As a result, "state legislation criminalizing child prostitution should change in light of trafficking legislation that
treats child prostitutes as victims of crime." 34 Adelson concludes that it is "counterintuitive to retain state statutes that
punish minors who are prostitutes when those same minors
might be protected victims" under federal anti-trafficking statutes. 35 Adelson is arguing that being the victim of trafficking
precludes liability for child prostitution. That is, being a victim
of one crime precludes liability for perpetrating another crime.
Our proposed victimhood defense requires that one and the
same conduct renders one simultaneously both a victim and a
perpetrator. That criterion is lacking here. One becomes a victim of human trafficking if one is transported and/or sold across
borders for the purpose of sexual or forced labor. 36 One becomes
a perpetrator of child prostitution by being a child who engages
in intercourse in exchange for money or material consideration.
But by the same conduct, one does not become a victim of
human trafficking and a perpetrator of child prostitution.
Rather, children who either in the past or future will engage in
prostitution are victims of human trafficking. However, by
virtue of that fact, they do not become perpetrators of child
prostitution. That is, one may passively become a victim of trafficking, but one must do something active to perpetrate child
prostitution.
One possible counterexample to our proposed defense is the
relationship between the crimes of unlawful drug selling and
purchasing. We might say that the victim of the crime of drug
selling is the drug purchaser. But that the drug purchaser is a
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. For the recent and controversial view that many "victims" of trafficking
are not true victims, see LAURA MARIA AGUSTIN, SEX AT THE MARGINS: MIGRATION,
LABouR MARKETS AND THE RESCUE INDUSTRY (2008); Brendan O'Neill, The Myth of
Trafficking, NEW STATESMAN, Mar. 27, 2008 (reviewing LAURA MARIA AGUSTIN,
SEX AT THE MARGINS: MIGRATION, LABOUR MARKETS AND THE RESCUE INDUSTRY

(2007)), available at http://www.newstatesman.com/200803270046.
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victim of the crime of drug selling does not preclude the criminal law's punishing the drug purchaser for perpetrating the
crime of buying drugs. By one and the same act-purchasing
drugs-one becomes a victim of the crime of drug selling and a
perpetrator of the crime of drug purchasing. So, by our criterion, the drug purchaser's conduct makes him or her a victim of
the crime of drug selling and a perpetrator of the crime of drug
purchasing. For this reason, he or she should have a defense to
the crime of drug purchasing. But, granting the defense to the
drug purchaser is perhaps not intuitively persuasive. We do not
seem to be troubled that the very conduct which renders a drug
purchaser a victim of drug selling also renders a drug purchaser
liable as a perpetrator of drug purchasing.
There are a number of possibilities as to the significance of
the drug seller/drug purchaser context. First, as a counterexample, it suggests that our criterion (where the defendant's conduct simultaneously renders him or her both a victim and a
perpetrator) for a victimhood defense is incorrect. Second, perhaps drug selling is a victimless crime. Or perhaps the drug
purchaser is not the specific victim of the crime. Either way,
that the drug purchaser does not seem to intuitively deserve the
proposed defense does not cast doubt on the criterion for or the
legitimacy of the proposed defense itself. Rather, the drug
seller/drug purchaser context is not a counterexample after all.
And third, even if there are some cases where the victimhood
defense should apply, it is not a generalized and uniform rule.
Although the drug purchaser presumably should not have a defense, it should not preclude other victims from having the defense. For example, the victims of rape by fraud (as perpetrated
by a juvenile) should have the defense to statutory rape.
Whether any of these possibilities are correct will require considerable further investigation into the viability of victimhood
as a defense in the criminal law.
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